An Application of Global Games to Signalling Model by Wichardt, Philipp C
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper Series 
ISSN 1424-0459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 223 
An Application of Global Games to Signalling Models 
Philipp C. Wichardt 
July 2006  
 
 
 
 
An Application of Global Games to Signalling Models*
Philipp C. Wichardt†
Department of Economics, University of Bonn
This Version: July 8, 2006
Abstract In a first attempt to apply the global games methodology to
signalling games, Ewerhart and Wichardt (2004) analyse a beer-quiche type
signalling game with additional imperfect information about the preferences
of the receiver. Their approach allows them to dismiss the unreasonable pool-
ing on quiche equilibrium. This paper revisits their example and discusses
how an extension of the set of strategies for the sender affects the analy-
sis. Interestingly, for an extended beer-quiche game, a unique equilibrium
is selected while two equilibria are consistent with the Intuitive Criterion
(Cho and Kreps, 1987). Apart from the technical analysis, potential eco-
nomic applications of the results, e.g. in a context of limit pricing and entry
deterrence, are indicated.
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1 Introduction
In 1993, Carlsson and van Damme introduced the concept of global games
as a means of equilibrium selection in normal form games. Inspired by the
vast literature on this topic (e.g. Morris and Shin, 1998 and 2003), Ewerhart
and Wichardt (2004) in an explorative study showed how the global games
methodology as a means of equilibrium selection can be successfully applied
to beer-quiche type signalling games. Their results suggest that the global
games methodology may serve to support the Intuitive Criterion as proposed
by Cho and Kreps (1987).
In this paper, we take up the suggested connection between global games
and the Intuitive Criterion and show that already a slight extension of the
message space of Player 1 (the sender) renders the global games approach
more selective than the Intuitive Criterion. Consequently, any conjecture
about a general equivalence of the two concepts for signalling games as sug-
gested in Ewerhart and Wichardt has to be dismissed. Apart from the techni-
cal analysis of the extended beer-quiche game, we also discuss some economic
applications of our results. In particular, we argue how the extended beer
quiche game can be viewed as a simplified version of the Milgrom and Roberts
(1982) model of limit pricing.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly re-
view the general line of argument followed by Ewerhart and Wichardt (hence-
forth E&W). Moreover, we provide some intuition for why an extension of
the message space of the sender can render the global games approach to
signalling games more selective than the Intuitive Criterion. In Section 3, we
formally introduce the extended beer-quiche game as well as the technical
details of the underlying model. Also in Section 3, we state and prove our
main results. In Section 4, we briefly discuss the obtained results as well as
their applicability to economic contexts. Section 5 concludes.
2
2 Global Beer-Quiche - a Review
We begin our discourse with a brief review of the original beer-quiche game
(Cho and Kreps, 1987). In this game, Player 1 (the sender) enters a bar to
have his breakfast. He can be either strong or weak and his preferences are
such that he prefers to have a beer if he is strong and to have a quiche if
he is weak. The probability of Player 1 being strong is given by p = 0.9.
Unfortunately, at the bar Player 2 (the receiver) is waiting. He is in an
aggressive mood and contemplating to fight the next guest to make an order.
Nevertheless, he would only like to fight against someone who is weak. As
the weak Player 1 prefers beer without fight to quiche with fight, each type
of Player 1 ordering his respective preferred breakfast is not an equilibrium.
Given such a strategy profile, a weak Player 1 would truly reveal his type
and, hence, would have to face the fight. “Coordination” of the two types of
Player 1 on either of the two messages would avoid this as Player 2 is assumed
to be unwilling to fight the expected type of Player 1. Yet, it appears to
be somewhat surprising that in equilibrium a strong Player 1 should order
a quiche. Cho and Kreps, therefore, used this example to introduce the
Intuitive Criterion. The Intuitive Criterion requires that, in equilibrium,
Player 2 at all unreached information sets assigns probability 0 to those
types of Player 1 that could not actually benefit from a deviation to the
respective message. In the beer quiche example this leads to the unique -
intuitive - prediction of pooling on beer.
Ewerhart andWichardt (henceforth E&W) show that the unique selection
of pooling on beer can be replicated if a global games approach to the game
is chosen. They introduce an additional type parameter t for Player 2 that is
only imperfectly known to Player 1 and that determines Player 2’s payoff from
fighting. In terms of the breakfast-in-the-bar story, we can think of Player
2 as being one of many possible types, all with different attitudes towards
aggression. Player 1, then, entering the bar may look into the face of Player
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2 and, assuming that many fights will take their toll, this may reveal reliable
information about the type of Player 2. Specifically, the type t is drawn from
a uniform distribution over [−k,+k], where k is chosen to be sufficiently large
to make fighting strictly dominant/dominated in the respective extreme. The
information Player 1 obtains about the type of Player 2 is modelled via a
parameter t˜ which in turn is uniform on an interval ε−close to the true
realisation of t, i.e. t˜ ∈ [t− ε, t+ ε]. To avoid confusion, we will talk about t˜
as the signal Player 1 receives about the type of Player 2. The order Player
1 makes, i.e. beer or quiche, is referred to as his message to Player 2. The
structure of the game as well as the payoffs are depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The global beer quiche game. f=fight, nf=not fight. The assump-
tion is that Player 2 knows t; Player 1 only knows t˜ ∈ [t− ε, t+ ε].
In E&W the ensuing argument crucially hinges on the game’s single cross-
ing property: Given the signal t˜, whenever the weak Player 1 has a weak
incentive to play beer the strong Player 1 has a strict incentive to do so and
whenever the strong Player 1 has a weak incentive to play quiche the weak
Player 1 has a strict incentive to do so. This essentially ensures that the
probability Player 2 has to assign to Player 1 being strong if he observes
beer can never drop below the prior. Hence, it guarantees no fight against
beer as long as Player 2 is not willing to fight against his prior, i.e. for
all t < 0.8, and implies that pooling on beer is the unique solution for all
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t˜ ∈ (−1, 0.8 − ε). As ε converges to zero, this leads to the selection of
a unique equilibrium almost everywhere (see E&W, 2004, for the details).
This equilibrium entails pooling on beer where desired.
In the sequel, we show how adding an additional message (xl-beer) to
the beer-quiche game that is strictly dominated for the weak Player 1 and,
hence, offers the strong Player 1 the option to unambiguously signal his type
renders the global games approach more selective than the Intuitive Criterion.
Roughly, the intuition is as follows. Assume that changing from beer to xl-
beer (with no fight) is less costly for the strong Player 1 than is changing
from beer to quiche (with fight) for the weak Player 1. Then, pooling on beer
can never be part of an equilibrium for those signals t˜ for which Player 1 can
infer with certainty that Player 2 is willing to fight against his prior. The
strong Player 1 would opt for xl-beer if his signal indicates that Player 2 is
sufficiently aggressive to fight against his prior. The global games approach
allows us to determine a unique switching point, i.e. a signal t˜, for which the
strong Player 1, in equilibrium, changes from beer to xl-beer. In the limit,
i.e. if the signal is correct, this allows us to obtain a unique equilibrium
prediction even for those cases where both pooling on beer as well as the
strong Player 1 playing xl-beer and the weak Player 1 playing quiche survive
the Intuitive Criterion in the underlying unperturbed game.
3 The Extended Beer-Quiche Game
In this Section, we analyse how the equilibrium of the global beer-quiche
game (cf. Fig. 1) is affected if the set of signals available to the sender is
extended by xl-beer, which is strictly dominated for the weak Player 1. We
begin our analysis with a description of the extended beer-quiche game. In a
second step, we introduce the formal model used for the subsequent analysis.
Finally, we state and prove the main result of this paper.
5
The Game
For our analysis, we extend the global beer-quiche game introduced by E&W
adding a beer of size xl to the message space of the sender. By assumption
xl-beer is strictly dominated for the weak Player 1 and gives 2.5 (if no fight)
and 0.5 (if fight) to a strong Player 1 (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: The extended global beer-quiche game. The dominated xl-beer
for the weak type is omitted. Again Player 2 knows t; Player 1 only knows
t˜ ∈ [t− ε, t+ ε].
Introducing xl-beer weakens the single crossing property used in E&W as
a weak incentive to play beer for the weak Player 1 no longer implies a strict
incentive for the strong Player 1 to play beer. However, strictly speaking
single crossing is still preserved. If we order the available messages for Player
1 in the obvious way, saying that xl-beer is stronger than beer which is
stronger than quiche, single crossing can be stated as follows: taking Player
2’s actions as given, a change to a stronger message is always strictly better
(less costly) for a strong Player 1 while changing to a weaker message is always
strictly better (less costly) for a weak Player 1. Moreover, the extended game
(Figure 2) satisfies an additional property, referred to as SC+, which will help
us to establish uniqueness of the equilibrium. Specifically, it holds that, if
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Player 2 fights against quiche and does not fight against xl-beer, changing
from beer to xl-beer is always strictly better (less costly) for the strong Player
1 than is changing from beer to quiche for the weak Player 1.1 SC+ can be
seen as an extension of single crossing. Single crossing implies that changing
from beer to xl-beer is strictly better for the strong Player 1. However, xl-
beer is strictly dominated by quiche for the weak Player 1. Consequently,
he will never change to xl-beer but switch to quiche instead. Yet, if fight is
certain against quiche, SC+ ensures that if the probability of fight against
beer increases, the weak Player 1 switches from beer to quiche after the
strong Player 1 switches from beer to xl-beer. Referring to both SC+ and
single crossing, we will say that the game satisfies an extended single crossing
property.
The Model (technical)2
In order to present the formal framework needed for the ensuing analysis,
we need to introduce some notation. Following E&W, we denote the set of
possible messages for Player 1 by M , i.e. M = {quiche, beer, xl− beer}, and
the set of possible responses for Player 2 by R, i.e. R = {fight, not fight}.
The set of types of Player 1 is denoted by Θ, i.e. Θ = {strong, weak},
the set of possible types of Player 2 is denoted by T , i.e. T = [−k, k] with
k > 1. Finally, the set of possible signals for Player 1 is denoted by T˜ , i.e.
T˜ = [−k − ε, k + ε].3 The resulting incomplete information game is denoted
by G(ε).
1Always means for all probabilities of fight against beer.
2We will use the concept of perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in distributional strategies.
The reader who feels familiar with these concepts or is less interested in the technical
details will be able to follow the main reasoning if he skips this subsection. Note only
that, given t, t˜ and message m, µ(m, t) denotes the probability Player 2 at m assigns to
Player 1 being strong, σ1(t˜), σ2(m, t) denote the Players’ actions and σ2(a,m, t) denotes
the probability with which Player 2 plays a.
3Different from E&W, we do not treat the pair (θ, t˜) as the type of Player 1. It seems
easier to follow the argument if we make a clear distinction between the type θ and the
signal t˜ at this point.
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The course of events is the usual one. In the first stage, Nature determines
a type and a signal (θ, t˜) ∈ Θ × T˜ for Player 1, and a type t ∈ T for
Player 2. The pair (t, t˜) and θ are drawn independently. The probability
distribution over Θ is denoted by p(.), with p(strong) = 0.9. We assume
that t is distributed uniformly over T and that t˜ is uniform on [t− ε, t+ ε].
The respective conditional density functions for t˜ and t are denoted by ν(. | t)
and ν(. | t˜). In the second stage, Player 1 observes his type and his signal
and sends a message m(θ, t˜) ∈ M . In the third stage, Player 2 observes his
type t and message send by Player 1 and chooses a response r(m, t) ∈ R.
Finally, payoffs are determined by u1(m, r, θ) for Player 1, and by u2(r, θ, t)
for Player 2.
As was explained by E&W, the players’ strategies can be modelled by
measurable functions
σ1 : Θ× T˜ → ∆(M),
for the Player 1 and
σ2 :M × T → ∆(R),
for Player 2, where ∆(M) (∆(R)) denotes the set of probability distributions
over M (R).4
Finally, Player 2, at each information set and for all types t, forms a
belief about the type of Player 1 and the signal received by Player 1. For all
information sets (m, t), we denote Player 2’s belief that Player 1 is strong by
µ(m, t). The belief about the signal received by Player 1 is determined by
the conditional distribution ν(. | t).
4Technically, we apply the concept of distributional strategies (Milgrom and Weber,
1985), where a distributional strategy for Player 1θ, θ ∈ Θ, is a probability distribution
ψ1θ on T˜ ×M such that the marginal distribution on T˜ as induced by ψ1θ is identical
to the marginal distribution of t˜ on T˜ ; a distributional strategy for Player 2m, m ∈ M ,
is a probability distribution ψ2m on T ×R such that the marginal distribution on T as
induced by ψ2m is identical to the marginal distribution of t on T .
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The equilibrium concept employed is that of a perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Slightly abusing notation, we write
σ1(m, θ, t˜) for Player 1 and σ2(r,m, t) for Player 2 to designate the probability
weights placed on their respective actions given t˜, t.
Definition 1 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is comprised of a strat-
egy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) and beliefs µ(m, t) such that
1. for all (m∗, θ, t˜), if σ∗1(m
∗, θ, t˜) > 0 then
m∗ ∈ argmax
m
∑
r
u1(m, r, θ) Pr(r |m; t˜),
where
Pr(r |m; t˜) :=
∫
σ∗2(r,m, t) dν(t | t˜)
2. for all (r∗,m, t), if σ∗2(r
∗,m, t) > 0, then
r∗ ∈ argmax
r
pi2(r |m, t),
where
pi2(r |m, t) := u2(r, strong, t) µ(m, t) + u2(r, weak, t) (1− µ(m, t)).
3. for all (θ,m, t), if the information set of Player 2 corresponding to m
and t is reached in equilibrium with strictly positive probability, i.e. if
∑
θ′
[
p(θ′) ·
∫
σ∗1(m, θ
′, t˜) dν(t˜ | t)
]
> 0,
then
µ(m, t) =
p(strong) ·
∫
σ∗1(m, strong, t˜) dν(t˜ | t)∑
θ
[
p(θ) ·
∫
σ∗1(m, θ, t˜) dν(t˜ | t)
] .
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Results
As we will see, merely adding xl-beer leads to the selection of unique equilib-
rium actions for Player 1 in the (unperturbed) limit game Ĝ(0), for almost
all t˜, t. Despite the fact that in Ĝ(ε) quiche can be dismissed for the strong
type using iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, this result is
somewhat surprising. For Ĝ(0) and t˜, t ∈ (−1, 0.8),5 both pooling on beer as
well as the strong Player 1 ordering xl-beer and the weak Player 1 ordering
quiche are compatible with the Intuitive Criterion.6 Thus, in the present con-
text, the global games approach is more selective than the Intuitive Criterion.
The exact equilibrium strategies obtained using a global games approach to
the extended beer-quiche game are given in Theorem 1.
To simplify notation, we introduce the following abbreviations: σs(t˜) =
σ1(strong, t˜), σw(t˜) = σ1(weak, t˜), q = quiche, b = beer, xl = xl−beer, f =
fight, nf = no fight. Moreover, we denote the belief Player 1 holds about
the probability with which Player 2 fights against message m, given t˜, by
η(m | t˜). In equilibrium, η(m, t˜) is determined by σ2, i.e. the strategy of
Player 2.
Theorem 1 In the limit, as ε −→ 0, equilibrium actions for both players
are uniquely determined on the equilibrium path except for a set of measure
zero. In particular, there exist t, t∗, t such that in the limit we get:
5In this case, i.e. with ε = 0, we have t = t˜.
6Pooling on beer is obviously compatible with the intuitive criterion. To support fight
against beer in the separating equilibrium, Player 2 has to assign a high probability to
weak types at his beer information set. This is possible under the intuitive criterion since
both types of Player 1 may potentially profit from a deviation to beer and thus off path
beliefs against beer are not subject to any restrictions.
10
σs(t˜) =
{
b if t˜ ∈ T˜ \ [t∗, t]
xl if t˜ ∈ (t∗, t)
, σw(t˜) =
{
q if t˜ ∈ T˜ \ [t, t∗] ∪ {t}
b if t˜ ∈ (t, t∗)
σ2(f, q, t) =
{
0 if t < t
1 if t > t
, σ2(f, b, t) =

0 if t < t∗
≥ 0.5 if t ∈ (t∗, t)
1 if t > t
σ2(f, xl, t) =
{
0 if t < t
1 if t > t
.
Strategies are undetermined where not specified, i.e. at the switching points.
Remark 1 For our particular example we obtain: t = −1, t∗ = 7
11
and
t = 1. See Figure 3 for illustration.
t
-1 0 17/11
t˜
-1 0 7/11 1
Player 2
quiche
beer
xl-beer
fightf ≥ 12
fight
fight
no fight
no fight
no fight
Player 1
weak
strong
quicheq
beerxl
quiche beer
beer
Figure 3: Equilibrium Strategies for ε→ 0 as stated in Theorem 1.
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Corollary 1 In the present context, the global games approach is stronger
than the Intuitive Criterion.
Before moving on to the formal derivation of Theorem 1, we first provide
a sketch of the proof. To prove Theorem 1, we consider Ĝ(ε) for ε > 0.
The argument, which is subdivided into 4 lemmas, is structured as follows.
After some preparatory (iterated) dominance arguments (establishing mainly
σs = b, σw = q for |t˜| > 1), we first show that as t˜ gets larger than −1, i.e.
as quiche is no longer dominant for the weak Player 1 (using two steps of
iterated dominance), we get σw(t˜) = σs(t˜) = b for some range of signals t˜
(Lemma 1). - This part of the argument is similar to the standard global
games argument. - Next, we employ additional equilibrium conditions in
conjunction with the extended single crossing property and show that, if in
equilibrium there is a t∗ such that at t˜ = t∗ the strong Player 1 changes
from beer to xl-beer, then t∗ is uniquely determined, given ε (Lemma 2).
In equilibrium, this change, which necessarily is accompanied by the weak
Player 1 changing back to quiche, has to occur at some point (Lemma 3). It
follows that, if there exists an equilibrium for this game, then the strategies
of Player 1 and Player 2 are already uniquely determined for all t, t˜ except for
a set of measure proportional to ε. Finally, we show how the remaining gaps
can be filled to establish existence of the equilibrium (Lemma 4). Putting
things together and letting ε converge to zero, we obtain Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. To begin with, we specify the regions for Players
in which one of their actions is strictly dominant (or a strict best response
using iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies). For Player 2
σ2(t) = nf is strictly dominant for t < −1; σ2(t) = nf is dominant against
the ex ante expected type of Player 1 for t < 0.8; and σ2(t) = f is strictly
dominant for t > 1. Moreover, σ2(t) = nf is a strict best response for Player
2 against xl-beer for all t < 1 since this message is strictly dominated for
the weak Player 1. Further iterating the dominance argument, we obtain
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σs(t˜) = b and σw(t˜) = q for
∣∣t˜∣∣ > 1+ ε, and σs(t˜) 6= q for all t (xl or b always
make the strong Player 1 better off). Finally, it follows that σ2(t) = f against
q for all t > −1 (as by the previous argument µ(q, t) = 0).
After this preparatory work, we proceed with the main step of the proof,
which is divided into four Lemmas.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, σs(t˜) = σw(t˜) = b, for t˜ ∈ (−1, 513 − ε) and ε
small.
Proof. From the above dominance argument, we know that σ2(b, t) = nf
for all t < −1. Assume that the smallest value of t for which Player 2 in
equilibrium is indifferent against beer is given by t′ > −1. Then, σs(t˜) = b is
optimal for the strong Player 1 at least for all t˜ < t′−ε. Moreover, the strong
Player 1 will only switch from beer to xl-beer if η(b, t˜) ≥ 0.25. Otherwise, beer
gives the higher expected payoff. Hence, in equilibrium we have σs(t˜) = b at
least for all t˜ < t′ − ε
2
. It follows that Player 2 being of type t′ has to assign
at least probability 0.25 to the strong Player 1 playing beer. Consequently,
in equilibrium, for t = t′, Player 2’s belief against beer is bounded. He at
least has to assign probability 0.25 to strong types ordering beer and at most
can assign probability 1 to weak types doing so, i.e.
µ(b, t′) ≥ 0.25 · 0.9
0.1 + 0.25 · 0.9 =
9
13
.
Therefore, no fight remains the strict best response against beer at least for
all t with
4
13
(t+ 1) +
9
13
(t− 1) < 0,
i.e. for all
t <
5
13
.
This implies that 5
13
is a lower bound for t′, so that σs(t˜) = b at least for all
13
t˜ ∈ (−1, 5
13
− ε). As σ2(t) = f against quiche for all t > −1,7 it follows that
also σw(t˜) = b at least for all t˜ ∈ (−1, 513 − ε).
Lemma 2 If in equilibrium the strong Player 1 changes from beer to xl-beer,
then this change has to occur for t˜ = 7
11
− ε
2
. Moreover, in this case Player
2 changes from no fight against beer to fight at t = 7
11
and the weak Player
1 changes back to quiche at t˜ = 7
11
.
Proof. Again let t′ be the smallest value of t for which Player 2 is
indifferent against beer. Then, σs(t˜) = b at least for t˜ ∈ [t′ − ε, t′ − ε2) (as
was shown in the proof of Lemma 1). Moreover, from Lemma 1 we know
that σs = σw = b for some range of t˜ > −1. As for t˜ > −1 + ε we have
η(q, t˜) = 1,7a weak Player 1 will change back from beer to quiche only if
η(b, t˜) ≥ 0.5. Thus, we can infer that σs(t˜) = σw(t˜) = b at least for all
t˜ ∈ [t′ − ε, t′ − ε
2
).
Now, for all t˜ ∈ (−1, 1 − ε) it holds that whenever the strong Player 1
has an incentive to play beer, the weak Player 1 has a strict incentive to
do so (a consequence of the extended single crossing property). It follows
that whatever Player 2’s beliefs at t′ are, µ(b, t) cannot increase for all t ∈
(t′, t′ + ε
2
). Yet, as t increases the willingness of Player 2 to fight increases.
Therefore, σ2(t) = f for all t ∈ (t′, t′+ ε2 + γ), for some γ ≥ 0. Knowing that
Player 2 will fight against beer for all t ∈ (t′, t′ + ε
2
+ γ) the strong type of
Player 1 strictly prefers to play xl-beer for all t˜ ∈ (t′− ε
2
, t′+ε+γ). Repeating
the preceding argument, we can conclude that the change of the strong type
to xl-beer has to last at least as long as the beer information set for Player
2 remains reached. This implies that Player 2’s belief at t′ is determined by
the respective probabilities of fight against beer needed to induce a switch
from beer to xl-beer (quiche) of the strong (weak) type of Player 1. To be
7See the argument preceding Lemma 1.
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precise, Player 2’s belief are given by
µ(b, t′) =
0.25 · 0.9
0.25 · 0.9 + 0.5 · 0.1 =
9
11
.
Since Player 2 is assumed to be indifferent at t′, and in fact has to be if a
change in his strategy is to occur at t′, this determines a unique t′ for which
this change indeed is possible:
(1 + t′)
2
11
+ (−1 + t′) 9
11
= 0
t′ =
7
11
.
If, in equilibrium, for some t > t′ the beer information set of Player 2 was
reached again, the relative proportions would have to be at least as the above
and, thus, fight would have to be the unique possible response in equilibrium.
Hence, if a change in Player 1’s behaviour away from beer occurs, it has to
persist at least for all t˜ < 1− 2ε. This proves Lemma 2).
Lemma 3 In equilibrium, σs(t˜) = xl for t˜ ∈ (0.8 + ε, 1− 2ε).
Proof. Consider the case where Player 1 gets a signal t˜ ∈ (0.8+ε, 1−2ε).
As mentioned in the proof of Lemma 2, if for a given signal t˜ ∈ (0.8+ε, 1−2ε)
the strong type prefers to play beer instead of xl-beer, the weak type will
certainly prefer beer to quiche. Thus, the probability Player 2 has to assign
to Player 1 being weak if his beer information set is reached for some t ∈
(0.8 + 2ε, 1 − 3ε) is bounded below by the prior. Consequently, the only
possible response to beer is fight. Hence, only the separating equilibrium in
which xl-beer is ordered by strong types and quiche is ordered by weak types
can actually be played. The switch from σs(t˜) = σw(t˜) = b to σs(t˜) = xl−beer
and σw(t˜) = q, therefore, has to occur at some point. As argued above, this
point is uniquely determined by the indifference condition (cf. Lemma 2).
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Lemma 4 For ε small, we can specify actions for both Player 1 and Player
2 for all remaining t, t˜ such that together with the above described actions
we obtain a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the extended global beer-quiche
game.
Proof. What remains to be shown is how equilibrium actions look like
around t, t˜ = 1. The potential trouble in this region derives from the fact
that it is not optimal for the strong Player 1 to change his strategy from
beer to xl-beer immediately as t˜ drops below 1+ ε. As a consequence of this,
the beer information set of Player 2, in equilibrium, remains reached for all
t ∈ (1 − ρ, 1), for some ρ > 0. Hence, beliefs at the beer information set
have to be determined by Bayes’ Rule, for t ∈ (1− ρ, 1), and as long as the
proportion of strong types is large enough, no fight is the optimal response.
This in turn extends the range of signals for which it is optimal for the strong
type to play beer, and so forth. Yet, to make the actions derived so far part
of an equilibrium, Player 2 has to start playing fight somewhere close to
t = 1. In order to achieve this is, however, the weak Player 1 has to play
beer for some t˜ ∈ (1− 2ε, 1− 2ε), and Player 2 in turn has to choose no fight
against beer sufficiently long to make the weak Player 1 willing to do so; in
particular, we need σ2(b, t) = nf for all t ∈ (1−ε, 1). The respective fraction
of weak types, who will be indifferent, then has to choose actions so as to
induce exactly the beliefs necessary to support a switching back of Player 2
to fight as t < 1 − ε.8 In that case, the strong type switches to xl-beer as
fight against beer becomes sufficiently likely. In the present example, this is
the case for t˜ < 1− ε
2
.
8Notice that whenever it is better for the weak Player 1 to try to imitate the strong
type, i.e. whenever the profit to the weak type from beer with no fight is larger than the
profit from quiche with fight, there has to be some ε̂ < 2ε such that no fight against beer
for all t ∈ (1− ε̂, 1) and fight otherwise makes all weak types of Player 1 getting a signal
t˜ ∈ (1− ε, 1 + ε− ε̂) indifferent between quiche and beer. For ε small enough this fraction
of weak types suffices to induce the necessary switch of Player 2 to fight against beer as
t < 1− ε̂.
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To ensure that the small fraction of weak types indeed suffices to induce
the necessary beliefs although the willingness to fight decreases as t decreases,
ε has to be sufficiently small. If ε is small, it suffices that σw(t˜) = q for
t˜ > 1 − ε
2
, but σw(t˜) = b for t˜ ∈ (1 − ε, 1 − ε + ω), 0 < ω = ω(ε) < ε2 ,
to induce the necessary beliefs. Given his type t, the expected payoff Π of
Player 2 is given by
u2(f | b, t) = (t+ 1) · (1− µ(b, t)) + (t− 1) · µ(b, t)
= t− 1 + 2 · (1− µ(b, t)).
For ε small we know that with the above proposed strategies µ(b, t) for t =
1− ε are given by
µ(b, t) =
ε/2
2ε
· 0.9
ω
2ε
· 0.1 + ε/2
2ε
· 0.9 .
As t falls below 1 − ε this probability decreases nonlinearly since only the
strong types are cut out but the fraction of weak types playing beer is unaf-
fected. Hence, since t decreases, the increase in u2(f | b, t) due to the increase
in 1 − µ(b, t) dominates the direct effect of t on u2(f | b, t). Consequently,
changing from no fight to fight indeed is possible. This proves Lemma 4 and,
thereby, completes the proof of Theorem 1. qed.
Let us briefly recap the crucial features of the extended beer-quiche game
that lead to Theorem 1. On the one hand, we obviously exploit the fact that
xl-beer is strictly dominated for the weak Player 1. On the other hand, we
used the extended single crossing property to restrict the possible beliefs of
Player 2. The fact that, as the probability of fight against beer increases, the
strong Player 1 gets an incentive to switch to xl-beer before the weak Player 1
gets an incentive to return to quiche guarantees a unique equilibrium. With-
out it, equilibria as in E&W will occur.9 To facilitate the argument, we
9In this kind of equilibrium, the strong Player 1 stays with beer for all t˜ ∈ (0.8, 1), the
weak Player 1 changes between beer and quiche in a way that keeps Player 2 indifferent
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chose the payoffs from xl-beer to be such that quiche for the strong Player
1 can be eliminated by iterated dominance. Notice however, that as long as
the extended single crossing property is satisfied (and xl-beer is not domi-
nated for the strong Player 1), Theorem 1 continues to hold. Single Crossing
guarantees that the strong Player 1 never plays quiche.
4 Discussion
As we have seen in Section 3, extending the list of possible messages by
xl-beer simplifies the analysis of the global beer-quiche game substantially.
Without invoking further existence results, as was necessary in E&W, we
were able to specify equilibrium actions for the global signalling game. In
the limit, we obtained equilibrium actions for both Players that are unique
for almost all t, t˜. In contrast to this, two equilibria survive the Intuitive
Criterion for the underlying unperturbed game with t, t˜ ∈ (−1, 0.8), ε = 0.
The reason for this discrepancy is that the Intuitive Criterion only re-
quires off path beliefs of the receiver to place zero probability on all those
types of the sender that would never profit from a deviation to the respective
message in the equilibrium under consideration. Otherwise beliefs are not
restricted. Thus, for the current example, Player 2 is “free” to assign a high
probability to the weak Player 1 against beer and to assume the strong Player
1 to play xl-beer already for t = −0.99 (thus sustaining the separating equi-
librium with σs = xl and σw = q), or to assume both types of Player 1 to pool
on beer for t = 0.79. The noisy information structure of the global game (i.e.
for ε > 0) excludes these possibilities, as it necessitates the incorporation of
expected behaviour in adjacent regions into the players’ analysis. Yet, not
against beer. Player 2 in turn “mixes” against beer (i.e. changes between fight and not
fight) in such a way that the weak Player 1’s behaviour is optimal. Existence of such an
equilibrium was proved in E&W. However, statements about convergence of actions for
t, t˜ ∈ (0.8, 1) as ε −→ 0 appear difficult for this case.
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only do outer dominance regions influence the players’ beliefs (e.g. making
it optimal for a strong Player one to stay with beer around t˜ = −1). Equi-
librium requirements for the whole game in conjunction with the extended
single crossing property also allow us to further restrict Player 2’s beliefs (in
the sense that, if a certain information set was reached, Player 2’s belief at
this information set would have to be in accord with single crossing). Thus,
taking limits (ε → 0), we obtain tighter restrictions on Player 2’s beliefs as
compared to case where the Intuitive Criterion is applied to the underlying
unperturbed game.
Following the above discussion, a natural question that arises is how fur-
ther extensions of the set of possible messages for Player 1 will affect the
outcome. In particular, it would be interesting to see how how the outcome
is affected by intermediate messages, e.g. between beer and xl-beer, that tie in
with the extended single crossing but are not dominated for the weak Player
1. Unfortunately, this question in general is difficult to answer. Of course,
the equilibrium described in Theorem 1 will be preserved as we can always
assume all of the new messages to be responded by fight whenever this is not
strictly dominated for Player 2, i.e. for t > −1 (in this case, they will never
be chosen). Yet, it is not clear whether uniqueness still obtains.
Another point that deserves a mention is the special structure of the
payoff perturbation. Assuming incomplete information of Player 1 about
Player 2’s payoff only from fighting may appear to be rather restrictive. For
signalling games in which the payoff of the receiver solely depends on the
type of the sender and not on the actual message sent, however, perturbing
the receiver’s payoffs from one response only is fairly comprehensive. What
matters to Player 1 is how much the receiver values one action relative to
the other. For this our approach allows us to reflect the whole variety of
possible valuations. Manipulating one payoff suffices to introduce incomplete
information about the characteristic of Player 2 that is relevant for the game.
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Finally, we want to emphasise the economic applicability of our model.
The extended beer-quiche game discussed in Section 3 can, for example, be
viewed as a simplified version of the Milgrom and Roberts (1982) model
of limit pricing and entry deterrence.10 In this case, we would relate the
type parameter of Player 2, the entrant, to the fixed cost of entry. The
type of Player 1, the incumbent, refers to his cost of production. A strong
incumbent has low production costs whereas a weak incumbent has high costs
of production. Beer and quiche are the respective monopoly quantities of the
incumbent and xl-beer would be an output the weak incumbent would never
want to produce. The unique equilibrium we obtain then can be interpreted
in the following way: if entry costs are low (high), the entrant always (never)
enters the market in the second period and therefore the incumbent produces
his respective monopoly output in the first round; between the two extremes,
both incumbent types pool on the monopoly output of the low cost type and
no entry occurs if entry costs are rather high; if entry costs are intermediate,
the low cost incumbent successfully limit prices and the high cost incumbent
concedes. If only three possible outputs are considered, the equilibrium is
unique for almost all entry costs.11
5 Concluding Remarks
Building on the findings of E&W (2004) we further pursued the question
how and under which circumstances a global games approach to signalling
games will be fruitful and how it compares to the Intuitive Criterion. For the
extended beer-quiche game analysed in this paper it turned out that through
the global games approach we are able to discriminate between two equilibria
which are compatible with the Intuitive Criterion. Thus, we concluded that
10See also Bain, 1949, and Matthews and Mirman, 1983.
11Another potential example is a central bank signalling context where the central bank
(Player 1) is imperfectly informed about the traders (Player 2) potential alternative in-
vestments.
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in general both concepts will not be equivalent. Furthermore, we briefly
discussed both the approach taken and the obtained results and indicated
some interesting economic applications.
The global games methodology in general is very appealing as it intro-
duces incomplete information about the payoffs of the game in a way that
appears to be very natural. A better understanding of its impact on the
analysis also of signalling games, therefore, seems to be desirable. We hope
that the preceding discussion has helped the reader to gain a better picture
of the analytical value of a global games approach also to signalling games.
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